{"product_id":"common-value-auctions-and-the-winners-curse","title":"Common Value Auctions and the Winner's Curse","description":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eBook info:\u003c\/strong\u003e Common Value Auctions and the Winner's Curse (Hardcover, 424 pages) – Princeton University Press, 2002. Language: English.\u003c\/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eAn invaluable account of how auctions work―and how to make them workFew forms of market exchange intrigue economists as do auctions, whose theoretical and practical implications are enormous. John Kagel and Dan Levin, complementing their own distinguished research with papers written with other specialists, provide a new focus on common value auctions and the \"winner's curse.\" In such auctions the value of each item is about the same to all bidders, but different bidders have different information about the underlying value. Virtually all auctions have a common value element; among the burgeoning modern-day examples are those organized by Internet companies such as eBay. Winners end up cursing when they realize that they won because their estimates were overly optimistic, which led them to bid too much and lose money as a result.The authors first unveil a fresh survey of experimental data on the winner's curse. Melding theory with the econometric analysis of field data, they assess the design of government auctions, such as the spectrum rights (air wave) auctions that continue to be conducted around the world. The remaining chapters gauge the impact on sellers' revenue of the type of auction used and of inside information, show how bidders learn to avoid the winner's curse, and present comparisons of sophisticated bidders with college sophomores, the usual guinea pigs used in laboratory experiments. Appendixes refine theoretical arguments and, in some cases, present entirely new data. This book is an invaluable, impeccably up-to-date resource on how auctions work--and how to make them work.\u003c\/p\u003e  \n        From the Inside Flap   \u003cp\u003e\"This book shows that the kind of winner's curse at issue is pervasive across various types of auctions and is not eliminated by experience or even by using expert bidders. One of its main contributions is the specification of naïve bidding models that explain patterns of deviations from (Nash) theoretical predictions. The ex post perspectives about how to improve experimental designs and procedures for dealing with bankruptcies were particularly interesting.\"--Charles A. Holt, University of Virginia\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"I know of no book that offers such a comprehensive treatment of theory and experiments in common value auctions. The papers it brings together represent very significant contributions to both auction theory and auction behavior and are of the highest quality.\"--Douglas Davis, Virginia Commonwealth University\u003c\/p\u003e           From the Back Cover   \u003cp\u003e\"This book shows that the kind of winner's curse at issue is pervasive across various types of auctions and is not eliminated by experience or even by using expert bidders. One of its main contributions is the specification of naïve bidding models that explain patterns of deviations from (Nash) theoretical predictions. The ex post perspectives about how to improve experimental designs and procedures for dealing with bankruptcies were particularly interesting.\"--Charles A. Holt, University of Virginia\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\"I know of no book that offers such a comprehensive treatment of theory and experiments in common value auctions. The papers it brings together represent very significant contributions to both auction theory and auction behavior and are of the highest quality.\"--Douglas Davis, Virginia Commonwealth University\u003c\/p\u003e           About the Author   John H. Kagel is University Chaired Professor of Applied Economics and director of the Economics Laboratory at Ohio State University. A leading economic theorist, he is coeditor of, and a contributor to, The Handbook of Experimental Economics (Princeton). Dan Levin is professor of economics at Ohio State University. He has published numerous articles on competitive bidding and industrial organization in leading economic journals.           Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.   Common Value Auctions and the Winner's CurseBy John H. Kagel Dan LevinPRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESSCopyright © 2002 Princeton University Press\u003cbr\u003eAll right reserved.\u003cbr\u003eISBN: 978-0-691-01667-2\u003cbr\u003eContentsPreface.........................................................................................................................................................................................xiiiCredits.........................................................................................................................................................................................xv1. Bidding in Common Value Auctions: A Survey of Experimental Research John H. Kagel and Dan Levin.............................................................................................11. An Initial Experiment Demonstrating the Winner's Curse.......................................................................................................................................42. Sealed-Bid Auctions..........................................................................................................................................................................53. English Auctions and First-Price Auctions with Insider Information...........................................................................................................................234. The Winner's Curse in Other Settings.........................................................................................................................................................335. How Do Bidders Learn to Overcome the Winner's Curse?.........................................................................................................................................476. Comparing Results from Field Studies with Experiments........................................................................................................................................537. Concluding Remarks...........................................................................................................................................................................608. Overview of What Follows.....................................................................................................................................................................662. First-Price Common Value Auctions: Bidder Behavior and the \"Winner's Curse\" John H. Kagel, Dan Levin, Raymond C. Battalio, and Donald J. Meyer..............................................851. Introduction.................................................................................................................................................................................852. Structure of the Auctions....................................................................................................................................................................863. Theoretical Considerations and the Winner's Curse............................................................................................................................................874. Experimental Results.........................................................................................................................................................................895. Summary and Conclusions......................................................................................................................................................................100Appendix: Inexperienced Bidders in Second-Price Common Value Auctions...........................................................................................................................101Notes...........................................................................................................................................................................................104References......................................................................................................................................................................................1053. The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions John H. Kagel and Dan Levin..............................................................................................1071. Structure of the Auctions....................................................................................................................................................................1082. Theoretical Considerations...................................................................................................................................................................1143. Experimental Results.........................................................................................................................................................................1194. Toward Generalizability: But Is This How the Real World Operates?............................................................................................................................1315. Conclusions..................................................................................................................................................................................134Notes...........................................................................................................................................................................................136References......................................................................................................................................................................................140Addendum: Benchmark Equilibrium for First-Price Auctions with Public Information................................................................................................................1414. Comparative Static Effects of Number of Bidders and Public Information on Behavior in Second-Price Common ValueAuctions John H. Kagel, Dan Levin, and Ronald M. Harstad.....................1491. Introduction.................................................................................................................................................................................1492. Structure of the Auctions....................................................................................................................................................................1523. Theoretical Considerations...................................................................................................................................................................1544. Experimental Results.........................................................................................................................................................................1605. Summary and Conclusions......................................................................................................................................................................169Appendix........................................................................................................................................................................................171Notes...........................................................................................................................................................................................173References......................................................................................................................................................................................1755. Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory Study John H. Kagel, Ronald M. Harstad, and Dan Levin......................................1771. Introduction.................................................................................................................................................................................1772. Structure of the Auctions....................................................................................................................................................................1783. Theoretical Predictions......................................................................................................................................................................1824. Experimental Results.........................................................................................................................................................................1875. Summary and Conclusions......................................................................................................................................................................202Appendix A......................................................................................................................................................................................203Appendix B: Derivation of Risk-Neutral Nash Bid Function........................................................................................................................................204Notes...........................................................................................................................................................................................205References......................................................................................................................................................................................2096. Revenue Effects and Information Processing in English Common Value Auctions Dan Levin, John H. Kagel, and Jean-Franois Richard.............................................................2101. Structure of the Auctions....................................................................................................................................................................2112. Theoretical Considerations...................................................................................................................................................................2133. Experimental Results.........................................................................................................................................................................2174. Relationship to Field Data...................................................................................................................................................................2325. Summary and Conclusions......................................................................................................................................................................232Appendix A: Derivation of Equilibrium Bid Functions.............................................................................................................................................234Appendix B: Full Information Maximum Likelihood Estimates.......................................................................................................................................236Notes...........................................................................................................................................................................................240References......................................................................................................................................................................................2437. Common Value Auctions with Insider Information John H. Kagel and Dan Levin..................................................................................................................2451. Structure of the Auctions....................................................................................................................................................................2462. Theoretical Considerations...................................................................................................................................................................2473. Experimental Results.........................................................................................................................................................................2514. Summary and Conclusions......................................................................................................................................................................263Appendix: Increases in Expected Revenue in Auctions with Insider Information....................................................................................................................264Notes...........................................................................................................................................................................................265References......................................................................................................................................................................................2688. Can the Seller Benefit from an Insider in Common-Value Auctions? Colin Campbell and Dan Levin...............................................................................................2701. Introduction.................................................................................................................................................................................2702. The Model....................................................................................................................................................................................2713. Conclusion...................................................................................................................................................................................281Appendix........................................................................................................................................................................................281Notes...........................................................................................................................................................................................282References......................................................................................................................................................................................2829. Second-Price Auctions with Asymmetric Payoffs: An Experimental Investigation Christopher Avery and John H. Kagel............................................................................2841. Introduction.................................................................................................................................................................................2842. The Base Model...............................................................................................................................................................................2853. Experimental Design..........................................................................................................................................................................2904. Experimental Hypotheses......................................................................................................................................................................2925. Experimental Results.........................................................................................................................................................................2956. Summary and Conclusion.......................................................................................................................................................................304Appendix........................................................................................................................................................................................305Notes...........................................................................................................................................................................................308References......................................................................................................................................................................................31010. Learning in Common Value Auctions: Some Initial Observations Susan Garvin and John H. Kagel................................................................................................3111. Introduction.................................................................................................................................................................................3112. Experimental Design..........................................................................................................................................................................3123. Theoretical Considerations: Measures of Learning and Adjustment..............................................................................................................................3154. Experimental Results.........................................................................................................................................................................3165. Summary......................................................................................................................................................................................329Notes...........................................................................................................................................................................................330References......................................................................................................................................................................................33111. Cross-Game Learning: Experimental Evidence from First-Price and English Common Value Auctions John H. Kagel................................................................................3321. Introduction.................................................................................................................................................................................3322. Experimental Procedures and Performance Measures.............................................................................................................................................3333. Experimental Results.........................................................................................................................................................................3344. Analysis and Conclusions.....................................................................................................................................................................337Notes...........................................................................................................................................................................................338References......................................................................................................................................................................................33912. A Comparison of Naive and Experienced Bidders in Common Value Offer Auctions: A Laboratory Analysis Douglas Dyer, John H. Kagel, and Dan Levin..............................................3401. Structure of the Auctions....................................................................................................................................................................3412. Theoretical Considerations...................................................................................................................................................................3413. Experimental Results.........................................................................................................................................................................3424. Conclusion and Discussion....................................................................................................................................................................346Notes...........................................................................................................................................................................................347References......................................................................................................................................................................................34813. Bidding in Common Value Auctions: How the Commercial Construction Industry Corrects for the Winner's CurseDouglas Dyer and John H. Kagel....................................................3491. Introduction.................................................................................................................................................................................3492. Bidding Structure, Industry Characteristics, and Sample Data.................................................................................................................................3513. Theoretical Considerations...................................................................................................................................................................3514. Bid Distribution Characteristics of Sample Data..............................................................................................................................................3545. Differences in Auction Structure between Theory and Practice.................................................................................................................................3586. Industry-Specific Characteristics and Their Relationship to Auction Theory...................................................................................................................3627. Summary and Conclusions......................................................................................................................................................................364Appendix: Variation in Subcontractor Bids to General Contractors................................................................................................................................365Notes...........................................................................................................................................................................................368References......................................................................................................................................................................................368Instructions....................................................................................................................................................................................370Index...........................................................................................................................................................................................395\u003cbr\u003eChapter OneBidding in Common-Value Auctions: A Survey of Experimental Research\u003cp\u003eJohn H. Kagel and Dan Levin\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e Auctions are of considerable practical and theoretical importance. In practical terms, the value of goods exchanged in auctions each year is huge. Governments routinely use auctions to purchase goods and services, to sell government assets, and to fund the national debt. Private-sector auctions are common as well, and of growing importance in areas such as deregulated utility markets, allocation of pollution rights, and the large variety of items now being sold via Internet auctions. Auctions are commonly employed when one party to the exchange (for example, the seller) is uncertain about the value that buyers place on the item. Auctions provide a mechanism, absent middlemen, to establish value in such situations. Auctions play a prominent role in the theory of exchange, as they remain one of the simplest and most familiar means of price determination in the absence of intermediate market makers. In addition, auctions serve as valuable illustrations, and one of the most prominent applications, of games of incomplete information, as bidders' private information is the main factor affecting strategic behavior (Wilson 1992). \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e Auctions have traditionally been classified as one of two types: private-value auctions, where bidders know the value of the item to themselves with certainty but there is uncertainty regarding other bidders' values, or common-value auctions, where the value of the item is the same to everyone, but different bidders have different estimates about the underlying value. Most (nonlaboratory) auctions have both private-value and common-value elements. There are also many different methods for auctioning items, with first-price sealed-bid auctions and open outcry English auctions being the most common institutions. In analyzing auctions, economists have focused on questions of economic efficiency (getting items into the hands of the highest-valued bidders), on maximizing sellers' revenue, and on how auctions aggregate information. The most developed branch of the literature deals with single-unit auctions, where a single item is sold to a number of competing bidders or a number of sellers compete for the right to supply a single item. Recent Federal government spectrum (airwave rights) auctions have exposed many gaps in economists' knowledge about auctions in which multiple units of closely related items are sold, and in which individual bidders demand more than a single unit of the commodity. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e The chapters in this book all deal with single-unit common-value auctions. As noted, in a pure common-value auction, the ex post value of the item is the same to all bidders. What makes the auction interesting is that bidders do not know the value at the time they bid. Instead, they receive signal values that are correlated with the value of the item. Mineral-rights auctions, particularly the Federal government's outer continental shelf (OCS) oil-lease auctions, are typically modeled as pure common-value auctions. There is a common-value element to most auctions. Bidders for an oil painting may purchase for their own pleasure, a private-value element, but they may also bid for investment and eventual resale, reflecting the common-value element. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e There are no efficiency issues in pure common-value auctions, as all bidders place equal value on the item. What has been of overriding concern to both theorists and practitioners is the revenue-raising effect of different auction institutions. A second key issue, one that provides much of the focus for the essays in this book, is the winner's curse, an unpredicted effect that was initially postulated on the basis of field data, and whose existence has often been hotly debated among economists. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e The winner's curse story begins with Capen, Clapp, and Campbell (1971), three petroleum engineers who claimed that oil companies had suffered unexpectedly low rates of return in the 1960's and 1970's on OCS lease sales \"year after year.\" They argued that these low rates of return resulted from the fact that winning bidders ignored the informational consequences of winning. That is, bidders naively based their bids on the unconditional expected value of the item (their own estimates of value), which, although correct on average, ignores the fact that you only win when your estimate happens to be the highest (or one of the highest) of those competing for the item. But winning against a number of rivals following similar bidding strategies implies that your estimate is an overestimate of the value of the lease conditional on the event of winning. Unless this adverse selection effect is accounted for in formulating a bidding strategy, it will result in winning bids that produce below normal or even negative profits. The systematic failure to account for this adverse selection effect is commonly referred to as the winner's curse: you win, you lose money, and you curse. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e (Terminological aside: Unfortunately, in discussions of the winner's curse, many economists, particularly theorists, use the term to refer to the difference between the expected value of the item conditional on the event of winning and the naive expectation [not conditional on the event of winning]. Further, their use of the term typically refers to the study of players who fully account for the winner's curse, rather than those who fall prey to it.) \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e The idea that oil companies suffered from a winner's curse in OCS lease sales was greeted with skepticism by many economists, as it implies that bidders repeatedly err, violating basic economic notions of rationality and contrary to equilibrium predictions. An alternative and simpler explanation as to why oil companies might claim that they fell prey to a winner's curse lies in cartel theory, as responsiveness to the winner's curse claim could serve as a coordination device to get rivals to reduce their bids in future sales. Nevertheless, claims that bidders fell prey to the winner's curse have arisen in a number of field settings. In addition to the oil industry (Capen, Clapp, and Campbell 1971; Lorenz and Dougherty 1983, and references cited therein), claims have been made in auctions for book publication rights (Dessauer 1981), in professional baseball's free-agency market (Cassing and Douglas 1980; Blecherman and Camerer 1998), in corporate-takeover battles (Roll 1986), and in real-estate auctions (Ashenfelter and Genesore 1992). \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e It is exceedingly difficult to support claims of a winner's curse using field data because of reliability problems with the data and because alternative explanations for overbidding are often available. For example, Hendricks, Porter, and Boudreau (1987) found that in early OCS lease sales, average profits were negative in auctions with seven or more bidders. Hendricks et al. note that one possible explanation for this outcome is the increased severity of the adverse selection problem associated with more bidders. However, they note that the data could also be explained by bidder uncertainty regarding the number of firms competing on a given tract (their preferred explanation). That is, since most tracts received less than six bids, it seems likely that firms would expect this number or less. As a result, although firms might have fully accounted for the adverse selection effect based on the expected number of firms bidding on a tract, they would nevertheless be incorrect for tracts that attracted above-average numbers of bidders, and overbid on those tracts. (These results, along with other empirical studies of OCS oil-lease sales, are briefly reviewed in section 6.1 below.) \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e The ambiguity inherent in using field data, in conjunction with the controversial nature of claims regarding a winner's curse, provided the motivation for experimental studies of the winner's curse. Early laboratory experiments showed that inexperienced bidders are quite susceptible to the winner's curse (Bazerman and Samuelson 1983; Kagel and Levin 1986; Kagel, Levin, Battalio, and Meyer 1989). In fact, the winner's curse has been such a pervasive phenomenon in the laboratory that most of these initial experiments have focused on its robustness and the features of the environment that might attenuate its effects. Additional interest has focused on public-policy issues-the effects of public information regarding the value of the auctioned item and the effects of different auction institutions on sellers' revenue. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e This survey begins with a brief analysis of the first experimental demonstration of the winner's curse (Bazerman and Samuelson 1983). This is followed by summaries of experiments investigating bidding in common-value auctions using an experimental design that we developed. These experiments also demonstrate the existence of a winner's curse even when allowing for extensive feedback and learning from past auction outcomes. They also address policy issues such as the effects of public information and different auction institutions (e.g., first-price sealed-bid auctions versus open outcry English auctions) on sellers' revenue. Experimental work on the winner's curse in other settings-in bilateral bargaining games with uncertainty, in \"blind-bid\" auctions, in two-sided auction markets with a lemon's problem, and in voting-are also reviewed. This is followed by reviews of experiments investigating whether and how bidders learn to overcome the winner's curse and a brief review of field data in relationship to findings from the experiments. The penultimate section of this survey summarizes the empirical findings from the experimental literature, and discusses several theoretical developments motivated by the experimental outcomes and the role this line of research has played in the successful sale of government airwave rights (the spectrum auctions). We conclude with an overview of the rest of the book. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e1. An Initial Experiment Demonstrating the Winner's Curse\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e Bazerman and Samuelson (1983) conducted the first experiment demonstrating a winner's curse. Using M.B.A. students at Boston University, the experiment was conducted in class, with students participating in four first-price sealed-bid auctions. Bidders formed their own estimates of the value of each of four commodities-jars containing 800 pennies, 160 nickels, 200 large paper clips each worth 4, and 400 small paper clips each worth 2. Unknown to subjects, each jar had a value of $8.00. (Subjects bid on the value of the commodity, not on the commodity itself.) In addition to their bids, subjects provided their best estimate of the value of the commodities and a 90% confidence bound around these estimates. A prize of $2.00 was given for the closest estimate to the true value in each auction. Auction group size varied between four and twenty-six. The analysis focused on bidder uncertainty about the value of the commodity and the size of the bidding population. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e The average value estimate across all four commodities was $5.13 ($2.87 below the true value). As the authors note, this underestimation should reduce the likelihood and magnitude of the winner's curse. In contrast to the mean estimate, the average winning bid was $10.01, resulting in an average loss to the winner of $2.01. The average winning bid generated losses in over half of all the auctions. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e Estimated bid functions, using individual bids as the unit of observation, showed that bids were positively, and significantly, related to individual estimates, so that bidders indeed faced an adverse selection problem, only winning when they had higher estimates of the value of the item. Bids were inversely related to the uncertainty associated with individual estimates, but this effect was small (other things equal, a $1.00 increase in the 90% confidence interval reduced bids by 3). Number of bidders had no significant effect on individual bids, although the sign was negative (but very small in absolute value). \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e In contrast, regressions employing the average winning bid showed that these bids were positively, and significantly, related to the winning bidder's estimate of uncertainty and to the number of bidders in the auction. This suggests that winning bidders are substantially more aggressive than other bidders. Indeed, Bazerman and Samuelson note that average winning bids were sensitive to a handful of grossly inflated bids. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e The results of this experiment show that the winner's curse is easy to observe. However, many economists would object to the fact that subjects had no prior experience with the problem and no feedback regarding the outcomes of their decisions between auctions, so that the results could be attributed to the mistakes of totally inexperienced bidders. The robustness of these results is even more suspect given their sensitivity to a handful of grossly inflated bids, which one might suppose would be eliminated as a result of bankruptcies or learning in response to losses incurred in earlier auctions. Common-value auction experiments conducted by Kagel and Levin and their associates explore these issues, along with a number of public-policy implications of the theory. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e2. Sealed-Bid Auctions\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e Kagel and Levin and their associates conducted experiments in which bidders participated in a series of auctions with feedback regarding outcomes. Bidders were given starting cash balances from which losses were subtracted and profits were added. Bidders whose cash balances became negative were declared bankrupt and were no longer permitted to bid. Unlike the Bazerman and Samuelson experiment, Kagel and Levin (hereafter, KL) controlled the uncertainty associated with the value of the auctioned item rather than simply measuring it. They did this by conducting auctions in which the common value, [x.sub.o], was chosen randomly each period from a known uniform distribution with upper and lower bounds [[x.bar], [bar.x]]. In auctions with a symmetric information structure, each bidder is provided with a private information signal, x, drawn from a uniform distribution on [[x.sub.o] - [epsilon], [x.sub.o] + [epsilon]], where [epsilon] is known. (Given this informational structure, private signals are affiliated in the sense of Milgrom and Weber 1982.) In first-price sealed-bid auctions, bids are ranked from highest to lowest with the high bidder paying the amount bid and earning profits equal to [x.sub.o] [b.sub.1], where [b.sub.1] is the highest bid. Losing bidders neither gain nor lose money. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e In this design, the strategy of bidding max [x -[epsilon], x], which we refer to as the risk-free strategy, fully protects a bidder from negative earnings since it is the lower-bound estimate of [x.sub.o]. This lower-bound estimate for [x.sub.o] was computed for subjects along with an upper-bound estimate of [x.sub.o], (min [x + [epsilon], [bar.x]]). Bidders were provided with illustrative distributions of signal values relative to [x.sub.o], and several dry runs were conducted before playing for cash. Following each auction period, bidders were provided with the complete set of bids, listed from highest to lowest, along with the corresponding signal values, the value of [x.sub.o] and the earnings of the high bidder (subject identification numbers were, however, suppressed). \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e Surviving bidders were paid their end-of-experiment balances in cash. To hold the number of bidders fixed while controlling for bankruptcies, m \u0026gt; n subjects were often recruited, with only n bidding at any given time (who bid in each period was determined randomly or by a fixed rotation rule). As bankruptcies occur, m shrinks, but (hopefully) remains greater than or equal to the target value n. Alternative solutions to the bankruptcy problem are discussed below. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e(Continues...)\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e \u003cbr\u003eExcerpted from Common Value Auctions and the Winner's Curseby John H. Kagel Dan Levin Copyright © 2002 by Princeton University Press. Excerpted by permission.\u003cbr\u003e All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.\u003cbr\u003eExcerpts are provided by Dial-A-Book Inc. solely for the personal use of visitors to this web site.\u003c\/p\u003e      ","brand":"John H. 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